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Abstract 
 
The EU’s flexicurity approach to labour market policy promised advantages for trade 
unions but also posed challenges, given their weak situation in policy formulation at EU 
level and in many member states. This article explores the potential for union 
mobilisation on flexicurity and unions’ capacity to influence policy debates and outcomes 
in two member states. In the UK, flexicurity has low political salience and unions’ 
weakened voice has given them little capacity for mobilisation or influence, although 
they have linked flexicurity to campaigns on agency workers and restructuring. In France, 
unions have developed alternative proposals on making employment pathways secure and 
have succeeded in shifting debate towards these proposals rather than the Commission’s 
flexicurity recommendations, although divergence between the positions of unions, 
employers and the state have limited outcomes to date. Unbalanced or instrumental 
application of flexicurity measures tends to erode rather than promote trust between 
social partners, in line with wider developments across member states. EU policies 
provide only weak leverage since trade unions’ ability to influence labour market policy 
depends on their position within domestic institutions. 
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Introduction 
 
For the past decade, flexicurity has been at the forefront of EU policy. For its advocates 
(European Expert Group, 2007; Muffels and Luijkx, 2008; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004), it offers a 
method for improving or creating new pathways out of unemployment, whilst also boosting social 
dialogue at European, national and even potentially local levels. It was seen as a bridge between 
opposing views on labour market policy in the globalized economy (Antoniades, 2008: 332). But 
for critics, flexicurity was narrow and unbalanced, increasing flexibility but reducing security 
(Burroni and Keune, 2011; Gray, 2009; Keune and Jepsen, 2007; Serrano Pascual, 2009); and the 
‘fragile consensus’ (Mailand, 2010) on which it was based fell apart in the economic crisis. 
Although the Commission maintains that flexicurity provides the best way out of crisis, the social 
partners at EU level now appear divided and sceptical, and there is little impetus to take the 
agenda forward. Rather, the ‘second phase of flexicurity’ involves country-specific policy mixes 
with little or no direct reference to the original model (Mandl and Celikel-Esser, 2012).  
The trajectory of the flexicurity approach to labour market policy is instructive. First, it 
highlights the differences between national industrial relations approaches and practices, not least 
the gulf which remains between east and west. Second, it raises important questions about the 
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nature, strength and salience of social partner involvement in European policy-making. Third, it 
draws attention to the ways in which EU-level policy affects trade unions’ ability to influence 
domestic policy. 
Official Community documents have presented flexicurity not only as a policy but as a 
method for building social trust and enabling complex trade-offs between flexibility and security 
through the ‘active involvement of social partners’ (EC, 2007b: 8). Where the necessary 
mechanisms for trust and dialogue are absent or weak, trade unions might be encouraged to learn 
from their counterparts in countries where such relationships prevail. Yet this is implausible. At 
national level, trade unions are not primary actors in the process but are largely dependent on the 
policy environment in their own country (Pedersini, 2008). In this, their strategies and responses 
are shaped by national ‘modes of securitization’ of labour market situations (Dufour and Hege, 
2009). Overall, the balance of forces at both European and national level means that unions are 
largely following an agenda set by government and business. In a largely business-oriented policy 
framework, unions have difficulty making their voices heard and are largely dependent on 
adapting their own goals to those of governments and employer organizations. EU decision-
making processes are deliberately depoliticized and technocratic, blocking effective trade union 
voice (Hyman, 2010), and the lack of demonstrable benefits of European-level engagement 
makes wider mobilization difficult (Gray, 2009). Nevertheless, it is argued here that the 
‘polysemic’ nature of the flexicurity model (Serrano Pascual, 2009) and its weak governance 
architecture may give trade unions some ideational space within domestic policy debates. 
In this article, I focus on union responses to the flexicurity agenda, starting with the 
European level and then presenting the cases of France and the UK. The analysis is based on a 
small number of interviews carried out in 2008-9 and in 2011 with the TUC (Trades Union 
Congress) and Unite in the UK, and the CGT (Confédération générale du travail) in France; with 
the Employment and Social Affairs directorate of the European Commission and the ETUC; and 
on policy documents, reports and published articles. The study is therefore exploratory, but it 
offers insights which could and should provide the basis for further research on other countries 
(see also Gwiazda, 2011), particularly at a time when the role of social partners in labour market 
reform has returned to the academic spotlight (Clegg and van Wijnbergen, 2011; Emmenegger et 
al., 2012).  
The two countries provide useful insights because they represent different work and 
welfare regimes and therefore different flexicurity pathways, according to the EU’s own 
recommendations (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). Whilst the UK (with a large share of low-skilled 
workers and clear segmentation between low-paid and high-paid workers) might be expected to 
focus on skills and support for the working poor, France along with other ‘continental’ regimes 
would be seen as needing to promote both internal (workplace) flexibility and support for external 
or transitional flexibility. France and the UK represent most-different cases in the sense of 
location at opposite ends of the flexibility-security spectrum (Muffels and Liujkx, 2008: 138) --- 
though these classifications need to be treated with some caution. Although both countries are 
situated close to the middle of the security spectrum, they diverge significantly on flexibility 
(Pedersini, 2008a: 5). 
 
 
The ETUC and flexicurity: ‘how theory is not applied in practice’ 
 
At its four-yearly congress in Athens in May 2011, the ETUC looked back on the progress of the 
flexicurity agenda and made its own counter-proposals for internal discussion. Over the period 
since 2007, the ETUC had moved from cautious support to opposition to the EU’s flexicurity 
approach. Its initial ambivalence is largely explained by what it saw as a gap between the 
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principle of flexicurity (‘genuine flexicurity’) and the fact that it was ‘not applied in practice’ 
(ETUC press release, 1 April 2011).  
Some affiliates could see advantages in emulating the Danish and other unions in 
promoting local bargaining to help ease transitions back into employment (ETUC, 2011a: 17). 
Moreover, the logic of social dialogue meant that the ETUC had an interest in trying to work with 
employers to improve the framework for flexicurity. At the very least, flexibility could be seen as 
‘better than nothing’ as at least opening a forum for dialogue. The ETUC claimed some success 
in securing agreement with employers on the 2007 joint analysis (ETUC et al., 2007) and the 
social dialogue work programme, in which job security and employment security were seen as 
complementary, and internal flexibility received priority over external, forming the basis of the 
EU common principles adopted in 2007. 
Yet the ETUC also emphasized fears of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (2006) and an 
imbalance between flexibility and security in EU policy documents (2007a). In opposition to the 
Commission’s emphasis on reforming standard forms of employment, it argued for protection for 
workers on non-standard contracts. In its response (2007b) to the Green Paper Modernising and 
Strengthening Labour Law it called for better protection for precarious workers, including and 
especially migrant workers; work-life balance policies for all workers; better enforcement of 
existing labour standards; and investment in social dialogue at all levels, as well as the training 
and active labour market policies promoted in the employability approach. As EU policy shifted 
increasingly towards promotion of flexible labour markets, and trade unions became increasingly 
marginalized in discussions of economic governance, the ETUC became more outspokenly 
critical, arguing (2011a: 18) that ‘the Commission’s approach to flexicurity changed completely’ 
in 2008-9 with the onset of the financial crisis. 
At the same time, the survey on national implementation of flexicurity commissioned as 
part of the social dialogue work programme showed that even in (Nordic) countries which had 
previously championed the approach, unions were struggling for a voice in debates about the 
future of labour market policy, while a majority of employers stated that their influence had 
increased during the economic crisis (Voss and Dornelas, 2011: 64). In both the domestic and 
European policy contexts, union confederations argued that flexicurity was being implemented in 
an unbalanced way. Yet the social partner survey still indicated high levels of support for the 
principle of flexicurity, with a majority of both employer and trade union respondents agreeing 
with that ‘if implemented in a balanced and holistic way’, the common principles can provide 
gains for both sides (Voss and Dornelas, 2011: 16). However, employers were more positive than 
unions, around a third of whom expressed disagreement; and views differed on specific aspects of 
flexicurity, with employers favouring contractual flexibility and unions emphasizing internal 
flexibility and measures to enhance the quality of work. 
The survey indicated that the flexicurity approach has had very little impact on domestic 
labour markets. For example, in our two focal countries, OECD data show very little change in 
strictness of employment protection legislation (an indicator of flexicurity) over the period 2000-
08: indeed, in both countries it increased slightly (Voss and Dornelas, 2011: 18). Moreover, key 
differences in expenditure on activation measures persisted: while France has far stricter 
employment protection than the UK, it also spends some eight times more on active rather than 
passive labour market measures (even though spending has fallen as a share of GDP in recent 
years).  
This is not to suggest that flexicurity initiatives have had no resonance. The survey 
highlights a number of cases of ‘good practice’ reported by social partners, involving either 
labour market reform negotiated at national level or locally-based employment transition 
initiatives. Overall, however, the survey indicates trade union disillusionment about the way 
flexicurity is being implemented in practice, and concerns about a relative lack of attention to 
measures of internal flexibility and active labour market policy which could help to mitigate the 
impact of economic crisis. This is true for both countries examined here. In the French case, only 
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the CGT and CFDT replied (of five confederations contacted), with the CGT putting forward a 
local employment initiative as an example of good practice. No UK trade union replied, the TUC 
citing time pressures as a result of intense campaigning against public sector cuts. 
According to the ETUC, even in countries which had pioneered the flexicurity approach, 
unions ‘really reject the word’ because of the absence of real, concerted follow-up (telephone 
interview, ETUC policy adviser, June 2011). Just as the social partners at national level argued 
that ‘it takes three to tango’ (Voss and Dornelas, 2011: 73) and bemoaned the weakness of 
government backing for social dialogue initiatives, the ETUC attributes the weakness of 
European social dialogue to the lack of political impetus from the Commission, since social 
dialogue operates effectively only ‘in the shadow of law’ (Falkner, 2000). At the same time, 
flexicurity still has ‘some value’ for the ETUC because it provides a space for the exchange of 
information and views across employers and unions, and across unions from different member 
states. Part of its alternative to austerity policies is a call for ‘genuine flexicurity’ (composed of 
internal flexibility measures within companies, and active labour market policies at national and 
local/regional level). ‘The member states with the strongest, most representative trade union 
movement, which are capable of combining determination to resist with a measure of genuine 
flexicurity are the benchmarks for the rest to match’ (ETUC, 2011b). 
 
 
The UK: An outlier in European labour markets? 
 
The weakness of the flexicurity debate in the UK (Wild and Voss, 2011) is perhaps unsurprising, 
given the reluctance of successive UK government to embrace European employment and social 
policy (Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004). The absence of British employer and union 
representatives from the EU social partner survey (only the local government employers’ 
association responded) and from the country cluster seminars reflects the employer view that the 
UK labour market is already adequately regulated and that there is little scope for a concerted 
approach. Indeed, the Confederation of British Industry has campaigned for a reduction in 
Community competence over social and employment affairs (CBI, 2010). Moreover, there has 
been little political impetus from European level, as the European Commission has neither urged 
any specific initiatives to modernize labour law and nor explicitly used the term flexicurity in its 
policy recommendations to the UK, in line with its emphasis on flexibility rather than security. 
The TUC policy officers interviewed for this study confirmed that the term flexicurity is 
‘not used particularly’ or ‘not at all’ outside the European/international policy department. 
However, since the late 1980s the TUC has referred to European regulation of social rights in its 
own campaigning and in lobbying at the time of European Parliament elections. Working time, 
more specifically the European Working Time Directive, has provided a particularly important 
reference point for the TUC’s public campaigns, but European social policy represents a 
significant frame for other issues, notably rights for parents and carers and regulation of ‘atypical’ 
forms of working. The TUC campaign on the protection of vulnerable workers chimes with the 
priority given by the ETUC to strengthening the rights of temporary and migrant workers. 
Nevertheless, a sense of UK exceptionalism permeates both the wider framing of flexicurity but 
also the way the TUC itself views the concept: ‘our position is a bit different from that of trade 
unions in other EU countries because there is no labour code to erode’. There is no overall labour 
inspectorate, and the limited capacity of the Health and Safety Executive exacerbates unevenness 
of protection. Temporary working has high salience for British unions because in the UK it is 
exceptionally weakly regulated by OECD standards (Wild and Voss, 2011: 6) despite 
representing a relatively high proportion of the labour market (TUC, 2005, 2008). 
Flexicurity is ‘controversial’ within the British union movement as it raises questions 
about the role of legislation. Preferring to focus on bargaining as the main vehicle for industrial 
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relations, most British unions resisted European legislation until the late 1980s when they were 
seriously weakened by government and employer hostility. However the issue remains divisive, 
and for some unions the flexicurity debate represents at best a diversion from the collective 
bargaining which should remain the main focus of activity, and at worst a means of undermining 
it.  
The main forum for debate on flexicurity so far has been the House of Lords European 
committee discussion of the Commission’s Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law. In its 
evidence (as in its own response to the Green Paper) the TUC argued, first, that flexicurity needs 
to build ‘high trust, high skilled workplaces which are equipped to deal with the rapidly shifting 
challenges generated by increased globalization’ (House of Lords, 2007: 52). TUC economist 
Richard Exell stated in his verbal response that flexibility at its best ‘is all about high levels of 
workers’ involvement in decision-making through collective bargaining and social partnership, 
high levels of training on emphasis on the high road to economic success, so training, investment, 
and going for high value added’ (House of Lords, 2007: 25). The TUC argued strongly that 
labour market regulation did not mean lower employment, but rather less short-termism and 
higher productivity. The TUC also gave priority in its response to a plea for more and better 
regulation of agency workers. However, it emphasized that more EU regulation was not 
necessarily the best solution but rather, beyond core European labour standards, the protection of 
collectively bargained guarantees for workers at national level. In line with the Commission’s 
emphasis on employment rather than job security, it advocated provision for better information 
and consultation of workers at times of restructuring and planned redundancies, rather than 
‘cornflake redundancies’ where workers learnt of the loss of their job on the morning news 
(House of Lords, 2007: 72). Finally, it argued that flexibility implied better work-life balance. 
Amicus, then the UK’s second-largest union (since merged with the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union to form Unite), also argued that labour law could best be modernized by 
strengthening collective bargaining (House of Lords, 2007: 108-10). Amicus was the only TUC-
affiliate to respond to the 2007 Commission consultation on the Green Paper; it argued that the 
UK needs to promote a high-skills strategy for growth based on effective rights and collective 
bargaining for an inclusive and adaptable labour market. The response cited national and 
international research to support its argument that numerical and functional flexibility can best be 
achieved by investment in skills. As a specific example of good practice, Amicus pointed to the 
TUC’s UnionLearn initiative, a government-funded programme supporting workplace union 
learning representatives, which was later cited by the EU social partners as the main example of 
good flexicurity practice in the UK (Wild and Voss, 2011: 11), as well as sectoral initiatives 
resulting in a trade-off between functional flexibility and upskilling, particularly in engineering 
and printing. In line with the TUC approach, Amicus emphasized the weakness of UK regulation 
of working time and conditions, and argued that unions have consequently an important role as 
‘the eyes of the regulator’ in monitoring basic workplace standards. This latter argument frames 
flexicurity in terms of workplace industrial relations, which has the potential to align the British 
union position with what has been termed the ‘local flexicurity’ approach of Norway, where the 
individual rights of a highly flexible workforce are guaranteed through the action of collective 
(union) representatives (Hagen and Trygstad, 2009). The link between strong collective 
bargaining and a flexicurity approach to labour market policy is also seen by the TUC as a 
desirable characteristic of the ‘Nordic’ model of trade unionism, potentially offering an 
alternative strategy of renewal for British trade union movement weakened by the erosion of 
bargaining in the workplace (Wright, 2011). 
However, the normative frame of labour market flexibility which dominated the House of 
Lords discussion and report continues to drive British policy. The TUC’s voice in labour market 
policy debates remains weak despite decades of campaigning. The main exception was the 
unprecedented agreement with the CBI and the UK government in May 2008, to the effect that 
temporary agency workers would be entitled to equal treatment with directly-employed staff after 
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12 weeks in a given job. This meant an end to the UK government’s blocking of long-standing 
Community proposals for an equal treatment directive for temporary agency workers (though not 
endorsing equal rights from the first day of employment, as demanded by the ETUC). The EU 
directive was adopted in November 2008, and the 2009 annual Trades Union Congress called for 
full implementation in the UK by spring 2010. However, implementation was delayed until 
October 2011, following adoption of a new regulation by Parliament in March 2010. Although 
unions welcomed the measure, they expressed disappointment at the UK’s failure to implement 
the European directive in full by ensuring protection from the first day, thereby weakening its 
impact (BIS, 2009). The twelve-week qualifying period constituted a key factor in the current 
Con-Dem coalition government’s decision to keep the regulations intact. The agency workers 
regulation thus highlights the tensions which have sparked academic and practitioner debates 
about the real impact of European employment and social policy on the UK: on the one hand, the 
transposition of the directive means that the principle of equal treatment for temporary agency 
workers applies for the first time; on the other, the way in which it has been applied means that its 
scope is severely limited. 
To summarize, the EU initiative on flexicurity initially sparked a political debate about 
labour market regulation, and also encouraged trade unions to explore the link between collective 
bargaining and labour market policy. But the debate was confined to a narrow political forum and 
framed in terms both of a traditional suspicion of European regulation, and of a strong normative 
bias towards flexibility rather than security. Overall, this had the consequence of both narrowing 
the public debate and marginalizing the trade unions’ contribution to it. The TUC for its part 
attempted to link flexicurity to its own campaign demands, but European issues continue to have 
little resonance in wider campaigning, and there is little evidence of any desire on the part of 
affiliated unions to push forward the flexicurity agenda. Unions remain divided on whether 
European rights erode free collective bargaining. Any European initiatives tend to be contested by 
the CBI and even if adopted their scope is limited by the conditions set during transposition. 
Perhaps most fatally, unions fighting the deepest public sector cuts since the 1920s perceive the 
European policy arena as little more than a distraction (interview, Unite, June 2011). 
 
 
France: An ambiguous Europeanization of debates on labour 
market reform  
 
In France, unlike Britain, the term flexicurity has been central to debates around labour market 
policy, but the term itself quickly became discredited and replaced by others, notably ‘secure 
employment pathways’ (Arnoult-Brill, 2007; Davy, 2012). Although its entry into the domestic 
debates may be seen to reflect the impact of sustained EU policy recommendations to reform 
labour contracts (EC, 2009: 26), the decisive factor appears to be a deliberate policy approach by 
the domestic political executive. President Sarkozy and his prime minister François Fillon 
expressed an interest in the flexicurity approach in 2006-7 when the former was presidential 
candidate and the latter his policy advisor. The new government’s decision in May 2007 to 
champion this labour market reform strategy is said to have decisively enabled the adoption of the 
EU common flexicurity principles (Mailand, 2010: 246). 
European policy framing has high salience in France, as policy-makers use it as leverage 
in domestic reform initiatives. On the other hand, domestic reference to European policy frames 
creates a certain amount of suspicion and allows opponents to reject them as inapplicable to the 
French context. Whilst political leaders have couched their reform initiatives in EU policy 
frames, specific measures conforming to EU recommendations have tended to fail. Political 
positioning on such initiatives reflects the weakness of policy consensus between government, 
employers and unions. Although France has incorporated the objectives of the European 
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Employment Strategy (EES) into its policy discourse and agenda, therefore, it has done so ‘in a 
peculiar (French) way’ (Graziano, 2011: 595). Adaptation has depended on the ideology of the 
political executive and on trade unions’ willingness to negotiate (Clegg and van Wijnbergen, 
2011; Fayolle, 2008; Graziano, 2011; Milner, 2005; Zirra, 2010). 
Aside from the European policy context, flexicurity has relatively high salience in France 
because debate around labour market protection has been at the forefront of domestic policy 
concerns since the 1980s. A survey of leading French newspapers showed an increase in 
references to the term ‘flexicurity’ from eight in 2004 to 52 in 2005, 110 in 2006 and 213 in 2007 
(Damon, 2009: 21). Well before the Commission’s 2007 Green Paper and recommendations on 
flexicurity, a series of a top-level reports commissioned by the government framed the debate in 
terms of a trade-off between security of individual employment contracts and guaranteed rights to 
social security benefits, largely defined as active labour market measures aimed at improving 
employability (Gautié, 2006; Grimault, 2008; Lefresne, 1999). The unions took up the 
recommendations and, from the mid-1990s, developed their own proposals around the idea of 
making discontinuous employment paths more secure. However, they responded in different 
ways. For reasons of space, this article focuses on the two largest confederations, CGT and 
CFDT; on the position of other confederations, see Grimault, 2008, 2009a.  
The largest confederation, the CGT, put forward the idea of a new type of employment 
relationship based not on individual employment contract but a universal status of employee 
providing the basis for sécurité sociale professionnelle (which can be roughly translated as 
‘occupational and employment security’) across the public and private sectors (CGT, 2003; Friot, 
2009). At its 49th congress in December 2009, the first resolution reaffirmed the confederation’s 
commitment to ‘new collective guarantees’ to make employment more secure, under the general 
heading of sécurité sociale professionnelle: a new mutualized fund to cover benefits for young 
and first-time job-seekers, and to guarantee the maintenance of employment contract and salary 
for workers in periods of transition between jobs, as well as new local agencies to supervise 
redundancy plans and manage collective funds for redeployment and retraining (CGT, 2009). 
However, the idea sécurité sociale professionnelle still remains underdeveloped, as it has not 
translated into either a full set of proposals for new social security rights, or a concrete bargaining 
agenda. It remains a leadership initiative which has not spread throughout the confederation 
(interview, CGT national secretary, May 2009) and indeed is contested at local level in many 
areas, because of its association with a reformist agenda of collective bargaining promoted by 
confederal leaders (Piotet, 2009: 23). The ambiguities of the CGT approach to flexicurity thus 
reflect its transition from ‘class and mass’ mobilization to a more differentiated approach 
including collective bargaining at all levels. 
The second largest confederation, the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du 
travail), put forward its own proposal for sécurisation des parcours professionnels (‘making 
employment pathways secure’), which subsequently became the most influential concept in 
French labour market debates. In its emphasis on the role of the union as accompanying social 
and economic change in the context of business restructuring, the CFDT distinguished its own 
position from that of the CGT conception of universal legal rights for workers. The CFDT 
identified three major aspects of workplace support for employees faced with business 
restructuring: forward planning of employment and skills, individual rights to redeployment and 
support for employee mobility, as well as state industrial policy and social dialogue (Jalmain, 
2003; Karvar, 2005).  
The CFDT, in contrast to the CGT, emphasises national-level bargaining with employers, 
which it defines as ‘social deliberation’. In this its policy is heavily influenced by its role within 
the tripartite unemployment insurance fund (which it chairs) and more broadly within the 
management of the social security system. This policy culminated in an agreement on 
‘modernising the labour market’ signed in January 2008 between three employers’ organizations 
and four of the recognised representative union confederations --- but not the CGT. The 
 8 
agreement established more flexible conditions for recruitment of workers and termination of 
employment, but maintaining some employee rights on termination of the employment contract. 
However, the success of this strategy was soon eroded when other unions refused to sign follow-
up agreements on training and unemployment insurance, leaving the CFDT stranded. Although 
the 2008 agreement, heralded as ‘flexicurity à la française’, not least because the government 
presented it in these terms (Brunhes, 2008; Chaussard and Dayan, 2009; Fabre et al., 2008; 
Gaudu, 2008), appeared to demonstrate a consensual, bargained process, in reality it disguised 
significant differences between the union positions, reflecting entrenched union identities and 
industrial relations structures which tend to favour union competition rather than cooperation 
(Grimault, 2008, 2009a). The CGT (2008) argued that it was weighted too heavily towards 
flexibility. The CFDT was the only confederation to sign the January 2009 agreement on 
unemployment insurance, rendering it ineffective in practice although legally valid. Although 
common ground exists --- the major confederations agree on the need for a renewed industrial 
policy at national and European level, on the need to set down individual rights to retraining and 
redeployment instead of redundancy, and on the principle of transferability of social rights --- the 
lack of agreement between the main confederations has effectively blocked the CFDT from 
taking the bargaining agenda forward; and by the time of its 2010 congress it acknowledged the 
limits of its reformist, negotiating strategy (CFDT, 2010a). 
The Sarkozy government appropriated the CFDT’s language of secure employment 
pathways, and Sarkozy even used the CGT’s term sécurité sociale professionnelle to mean 
something quite different: new forms of short-term contract (Sarkozy, 2005). The same 
terminology was thus being deployed to support conflicting approaches to labour market policy 
(Lefresne, 2006). However, when Sarkozy referred his proposal for a single labour contract to the 
social partners, in line with the 2007 law on the modernization of social dialogue, the unions 
formed a united front and made clear their opposition to any attack on the present contractual 
arrangements (in line with the broad ETUC position, as French commentators noted) (Fabre et al., 
2008: 16). Curiously, the employers’ lobby did not align with the government position, preferring 
to focus on ‘separability’ between work and non-work (and making it easier to hire and fire) 
which presumably aimed to oppose the union idea of easing transitions. Moreover, the main 
employers’ organization, MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France) rejected the single 
contract idea as formulated by government, and instead indicated willingness to develop new 
proposals to introduce very short-term portfolio contracts and trial employment contracts. The 
employers’ reluctance to frame the discussion in terms of flexicurity meant the absence of any 
real common ground between contracting parties. Unions and employers took up different 
positions within the social dialogue, each using different terminology. 
The social partners’ agreement of January 2008 and the legislative follow-up surprised 
many commentators who expected to see more emphasis on flexibility of employment contracts 
and more precise measures to support the general principles of transferable rights and assistance 
for redeployment (Fabre et al., 2008; Kramartz, 2008). The form of ‘French-style flexicurity’ 
contained in the agreement is a curious mixture of flexibility and security which does consist of a 
series of trade-offs within a context of negotiation, but in a rather unbalanced and unsystematic 
way which reinforces the incrementalism and complexity of French labour market regulation. 
Redundancy protection is made slightly more flexible, but by allowing a shift away from law to 
collective bargaining (Fabre et al., 2008). Without follow-up at any level, ‘French-style 
flexicurity’ --- in the sense that the political executive had sought to promote --- ran aground.  
However, in the wake of the 2008 agreement, consensus emerged around proposals on 
secure employment pathways framed in terms of retraining and redeployment, with the January 
2009 social partner agreement (signed by all the major trade union confederations except FSU 
and SUD) leading to the creation in March 2010of the Fonds paritaire de sécurisation des 
parcours professionnels (FPSPP, National Fund for Secure Employment Pathways). The fund, 
managed on a bipartite basis with the CGT as chair and MEDEF as vice-chair, redeployed 
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existing national and regional vocational training funds to focus on training of young and 
unskilled unemployed people. Despite a difficult start marked by disagreements between the 
social partners and the government over the latter’s financial commitment to the fund, the FPSPP 
nevertheless marked a renewed phase of bargaining between the social partners around the trade 
unions’ agenda of secure employment pathways, which brought the CGT and CFDT closer 
together in support of labour market integration of unemployed youth (Clegg and van 
Wijnbergen, 2011). It also formed a basis for debates on training policies and labour market 
activation in the 2012 presidential election (Groupe Alpha, 2012). Whilst the incumbent president 
Sarkozy proposed a complete overhaul of vocational training and promised to submit his plans to 
a referendum if the social partners failed to reach a solution, the successful candidate François 
Hollande made secure employment pathways (using the vocabulary of the social dialogue) one of 
his sixty campaign promises, pledging to convene a national employment and social policy 
summit with the social partners in the summer of 2012 and to use state funds to boost retraining 
funds. The social partners for their part made clear that secure employment pathways formed part 
of an agenda of (bipartite) social dialogue distinct from tripartite social policy-making (see for 
example interview with CFDT general secretary François Chérèque, Libération, 30 April 2012).  
The outcome of the social dialogue process therefore demonstrates the difficulties of 
negotiating flexicurity in the absence of high-trust relations, particularly given the initial 
instrumentalization of European policy by the political executive. It confirms the ambiguous 
Europeanization of labour market policy in France, whereby European policy acts as a trigger for 
debate in the domestic political space (Voss and Dornelas, 2011: 84) but does not decisively 
influence outcomes. Trade unions have demonstrated their capacity to influence policy debates 
through academic, media and public opinion, and (defensively and negatively) through formal 
channels of dialogue such as tripartite and bipartite funds, and through the national bargaining 
process with the main employer associations. In turn, the bargaining process has encouraged a 
repositioning of the major trade union confederations, with the two largest, CGT and CFDT, 
moving closer together on labour market policy (as in other respects). The union debates about 
flexicurity (albeit under another name) have formed part of their ongoing process --- difficult, 
fragmentary, slow and uneven --- of renewal and recomposition.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brief overview of trade union debates on flexicurity and their contribution to national policy 
debates on labour market reform has sought to ascertain, on the basis of two national cases and in 
the context of the European social partner survey of members, whether unions been able to 
respond to the flexicurity agenda and how differences in the level and nature of union 
mobilization might be understood. 
It is apparent that the flexibility approach offers some advantages which trade unions 
have been willing to explore in their internal debates and, where the opportunity presents itself, in 
negotiations with employers. Trade unionists from both France and the UK readily spoke of the 
benefits of a Nordic approach to economic restructuring based on flexible transitions and 
supported by high levels of short-term social protection. Early promotion of flexicurity by Danish 
unions, under the auspices of the ETUC, was mentioned in interviews by both British and French 
respondents as having raised awareness and opened possibilities of emulation. This highlights the 
potential for mutual learning, including formally through the ETUC, as a form of Europeanization 
of union activity (Hoffmann and Hoffmann, 2009). However, in practice trade unionists report 
strong distrust and scepticism about the future of the flexicurity approach. French and British 
trade unionists argue that flexicurity cannot be applied across member states because it requires 
previously existing high-trust relations and a bargaining culture, and cannot be used to promote 
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such a culture where none already exists (interview with international officer, Unite, January 
2011). 
At European level, the lack of demonstrable outcomes has led to doubts about the 
usefulness of the approach. Moreover, the application of the flexicurity approach to European 
policy and national labour market recommendations has had the effect of eroding trust and 
polarizing positions at both European and national levels. It is therefore difficult to see how 
flexicurity can provide a useful policy framework in future, in the absence of engagement by 
either the Commission or social partners in order to strengthen the link between flexicurity as 
content and as method. This would require for example more systematic linkage of national social 
dialogue to reporting in national reform programmes as well as to European social dialogue. 
On the other hand, flexicurity has had the value of at least encouraging dialogue and generating 
an exchange of information and views. Moreover, there is at least potential for further learning 
through linking local, national and European campaigns. In other words, the value of flexicurity 
may be seen less in terms of specific policy outcomes or more general policy convergence than as 
a discursive and deliberative tool. 
This brief overview has focused on two very different countries in terms of their location 
on the flexibility-security scale. Accepting the fit-misfit thesis to explain and predict the impact 
of European policies, we would expect to see strong pressures for Europeanization of domestic 
policy in both countries, but along different axes: in France, towards greater flexibility and in the 
UK, increased worker security as a counterpart to flexibility. However, our comparative analysis 
has highlighted the extent to which domestic policy debates are structured by existing state-
market-society relations and institutional practices, as well as by attitudes towards European 
integration both as a political and as a socio-economic project. In the UK case, the institutional 
and ideological weakness of trade unions in relation to the employers’ organizations, coupled 
with political resistance to Europeanization of labour market policy, has drastically reduced any 
leverage capacity for unions. In any case, the European Commission approach, which has focused 
on the flexibility dimension of flexicurity, has narrowed the available space for mobilization. In 
France on the other hand the political executive has used the European policy space as a lever for 
domestic policy reform, but the incoherence of institutional relations between state, employers 
and unions has prevented policy change and led to an ambiguous and somewhat confused 
exchange of ideas. 
In neither country is the term flexicurity widely used; nor have EU recommendations 
found their way into domestic debates or initiatives. The intensity of debates around secure 
employment pathways in France results from domestic initiatives, whilst the term flexicurity is 
viewed with suspicion if not outright hostility. For some commentators, the EU proposals serve 
only to confuse domestic debates, and flexicurity is simply a product of the weakness of EU 
employment regulation (Lefresne, 2008). 
Two main approaches to explaining the domestic salience of flexicurity have been 
identified in the literature: the first relating to domestic party politics, the second emphasizing the 
importance of domestic industrial relations structures. Gwiazda (2011) suggests that the key 
variable is the ruling party’s support for European integration, rather than left-right party politics, 
whilst Mailand (2010) in contrast suggests that degree of support for integration is not the key 
variable but that political leadership is crucial. The cases presented here confirm that party-
political factors may certainly be an explanatory variable relevant to the initial salience of 
flexicurity. However, industrial relations institutions and practices (Pedersini, 2008) may be more 
helpful in explaining the outcome of flexicurity debates, as in the French case. In Belgium, too, it 
has been suggested that although pro-European leadership ensured that the flexicurity approach 
found resonance in political debate, union distrust meant that the concept failed to make headway 
(Conter and Berthet, 2011). 
In the case of flexicurity, European policy has failed to resonate with national regulation 
of employment and labour market policy, other than by the action of purposive political actors 
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who have attempted to use the European policy as leverage in domestic policy-making. This may 
not apply across all areas of employment policy, but the study sheds light on the weakness of 
vertical and horizontal linkages of European policy-making and the continued ‘stickiness’ of 
national industrial relations institutions. 
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